Lawrence of Arabia is best remembered for the Oscar-winning film about his life. Foreign policy expert Dr. John C. Hulsman focuses on a different T.E. Lawrence, a man who applied his unique experiences and extensive knowledge of the Arab world to a political vision for nation building in the Middle East. American author Jiffer de Bourguignon talked to John Hulsman for Amerika Haus e.V. NRW.

JB: You are a foreign policy specialist, not a historian. What inspired you to write this book?

John Hulsman: The very practical policy world that I live in. I was involved in various task forces on nation building, on what to do in Iraq after the war came to an end. On each of these task forces I found people who had never been to the area, who knew nothing of the history, the culture, the ethnology, the sociology, giving me bland assurance that they could remake the society. And I put up this as the junior person on these things among the great and the good of the Council on Foreign Relations of which I’m a member. Finally I couldn't stand it any longer. I stood up and said very theatrically, 'Better they build it badly than we build it well because it is their culture and our time here is short.' It sounded very good and there was a moment of silence and then we all went back to the nation building people who didn't know anything about it again.

But I went back to the people I was working with and said, 'That was really good but it's not original; it's what I was thinking but someone else said it but I cant remember who. Why don't we find out who said it.' Turns out it was T.E. Lawrence. I said to my staff at the time, 'Give me everything you possibly can on Lawrence, what he thought, beyond the movie that we all loved, what he did, and let's see if there was coherent philosophy or if this was just a really clever sound bite.' And that began my three years in the desert with the Colonel.

Very early on in my research, I found a document called the "27 Articles". I felt a bit like Indiana Jones, dusting off the document, it was literally kind of like that. In this document, he was instructed by his seniors, the British authorities, to write down his philosophy on his way of working with developing peoples in order to preserve it. So in the middle of fighting a guerrila war, Lawrence had to stop and write a memo. I can hear him swearing from here. (laughs) And he was typing as he did with one finger on each hand on his typewriter. And he came up with this document that was a totally different philosophical way to deal with developing peoples who were trying to build a nation. The more I read, the more I thought about the task forces I was serving on and it occured to me that there was a huge hidden treasure here.

JB: Lawrence's 27 Points, which we will get into in just a moment, center on using local knowledge, giving priority to local culture and tradition, and employing local people, instead of imposing a foreign methodology. This seems to be somewhat common sensical - at least in this day and age. Shouldn't the Western world have learned this already?

John Hulsman: We should have. Like most good ideas people pay lip service to this and says, 'Yeah, we should work with this. This is important.' But immediately it's thrown out the window under conflicting realities. I'll give you an example: people said the Iraqis should have more of a say in what they do. We should stop dictating to them. We all agree; except we want them to adopt our standards of women's rights now and we're going to go tell Grand Ayatollah Sistani he has to. Well, no one is saying America's views of women's rights aren't a good thing - they are. But do you think Grand Ayatollah Sistani is likely to be very succeptable to this? And what is the immediate goal? The immediate goal is to get out of Iraq in a stable society broadly represented by the three major groups there that lasts long after the Americans leave - that's the goal. Everything has to follow from that. Everybody agrees with this. But the moment there is a contrary or conflicting desire, out it goes. And Lawrence said we should start with this, this has to be the primary focus, everything follows from it. So yes, the danger in this is to say, "Yeah, of course" and then go back to writing their constitution for them. And I think the reality is that it is a different philosophy.

JB: In the book you go over a number of Lawrence's lessons and how they a might apply today. You mention that Lawrence insisted on local leadership, for example, he insisted that Arab officers were in charge while his role and that of other British military personel was merely that of support. With regards to Afghanistan, while the U.S. and its allies have supported a traditional loya jirga after the fall of the Taliban and held elections, attempted to focus on "hearts and minds", and assisted with Afghan police and military training, whether or not we are really using local knowledge and leadership is questionable at best. Are we following Lawrence's example in Afghanistan or are we going against his philosophy in your opinion?

John Hulsman: I think we have been behind the curve as Generals Patraeus and McCrystal have admitted. I know Patraeus a little bit and I think the world of him. They are both very fine officers. We've been very adaptable, we've learned from mistakes but we've always been a step behind because we haven't embraced the philosophy. We've just been very quick learners which is better than nothing, by the way. After Iraq, that's a step forward.

But the reality is that two tracks are going on. PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams) are working. We have made at a micro-level a lot of local process working with what's there, with local leaders, with people who have legitimacy. As I say in the book, you can be a tribal leader or even a warlord and have legitimacy. It doesn't have to be Jeffersonian, as I would like it. (Not being Jeffersonian) doesn't mean you don't have legitimacy; maybe you have a great deal of it - maybe you're the fifth generation to run that shop and I am going to work with you. I think we grasp that, down the ranks, in particular. I think there are two tracks though: we've grasped it at the local level but we haven't tied in what we're doing to the more national level.

I think president Karzai is incompetent, corrupt, ruthless and has no legitimacy - that's a bad combination. I think the national elections were a disaster and whatever we did at that point we were damned. The problem is that the way the constitution has been written, too much power is in the center which doesn't suit Afghanistan. They need a much more confederal constitution, similar to ours, frankly. It would suit the people on the ground because the tribal nature of the unit of politics would really drive it - make it regional, make it local. There is much more power there. Because we were under tremendous constraints, we went with the 'one size fits all' strong central government approach. The problem with that is is that the whole place fell apart: it doesn't have a strong central goverment because of the system. On the more positive note, I think the local stuff that we've done and increasingly are doing is exactly the right way to do it.

JB: You make another point about the need to work with "the only game in town". In Lawrence's case, this meant working with a ruthless warlord known as "Auda", who by today's UN standards would be considered a war criminal. Given Lawrence's stance on working with undesirables out of necessity, do you think he would advocate negotiating with the Taliban?

John Hulsman: I think he would. And I do. But one of the things about the Taliban, a bit like the Iraqi insurgency, is the term makes it far more coherent than it is. There are people with the Taliban who are strict followers of Mullah Omar, who will never ever for a few hundred bucks be our friends. And then there's a small percentage that are even more fanatical al-Quaeda people -with whom we can do no business.

That leaves a good percentage of "Taliban" who are a mix of nationalists, who don't like foreign invaders ever and have always taken to the hills when foreign invaders have come, from Alexander the Great on. I can work with that. The problem and the strength of the Taliban is that they actually live in the country. They are part of that society, they are not outside forces.

And your Auda reference is exactly right: Auda was cantankerous, Auda was certainly a war criminal by modern standards. He was also certainly a brilliant guerrilla officer, without a doubt. But Lawrence said, "This is what I have to work with and by and large, I am going to make this work even though it's going to ruin my health." I think we need to have the same attitude. We can hive off a good third of the Taliban if we play our cards right and really divide this amorphous group that really don't have a lot in common. I think that is vital politically and I think Lawrence would do it.  We have to go into it with open eyes as Lawrence did about Auda.

JB: There are experts who have people who have spent their lives studying Afghan culture, history, language, etc. Obama, and presumably Bush before him, has built a team of experts on the region with Richard Holbrooke at the helm. Why then does it seem that despite this expertise and harnessing of local knowledge - which Lawrence was a strong advocate of - does the U.S. seem doomed to repeat the mistakes of the past in the face of a resurgent Taliban?

John Hulsman: Well, I can tell you this with some authority, the Bush people on Iraq did not possess any local knowledge. There was one - out of 200 senior staffers around Bremer - one person had an advanced degree and any kind of experience with Iraq. One person. And one of Lawrence's lessons is "you can't remake a society you don't know anything about". It so obvious yet no one thought about it. I was around then and it was 'jobs for the boys'. I had friends at various think tanks who were very bright people but they knew nothing culturally of the region. They knew a lot about Washington. But they knew a lot of nothing about the Middle East. And we paid a price.

In the case of Afghanistan, there is more knowledge but far less than you think. When I press people as to what they did with Afghanistan, when I go around the table, for example when I was in Washington 3-4 months ago doing a round on Afghanistan for various people, other than the military people who were pretty seasoned, there was not a lot of knowledge. There were people who had regional expertise or functional expertise, a lot of good economists, but generalists, not anybody who did apply this local knowledge that Lawrence thought was so vital. I am actually constantly surprised at the lack of that. We are playing catch up; the CIA now recruits people who speak Dari, Pashtu, Arabic, Mandarin. But it will take years to grow that. I can speak from my own think tank experience that the number of people with specific expertise in Iraq or Afghanistan you could count on one hand. Maybe two. But that's it.

There are three things going on all of which pull in opposite directions: there's this chronic lack of knowledge, limitless goals going in and pressure put on the Obama administration to limit all forms of new foreign adventures of any kind because of our deficit. This is the single most undiscussed thing of the moment: there is no money to do anything.

JB: Perhaps an even bigger problem than the lack of funds is the growing lack of political will at home. Obama has recently announced an "exit strategy" and a time table for withdrawal from Afghanistan. What would Lawrence have to say about this?

John Hulsman: Ok if you're the Taliban, you're just setting your watches, aren't you? (laughter) Let's go into the mountains for four years. Oh and if you work with these guys, we'll come back and kill you.

Seriously, that compromise makes no sense unless you live in Washington. It has nothing to do with Afghanistan. Nothing. It has everything to do with a president who says, 'I need to get this appropriation funded.' To his credit, he's putting it all on budget, unlike the Bush people. You can see how much this costs, it's included in the deficit numbers now. It's not some special emergency area. And of course, part of that is that now people can see how much things costs. Which is very democratic and open but it doesn't help them.

So the Democrats say, 'We're really against the troop numbers.' Obama knows that he is triangulating by saying, 'Afghanistan is my war'. He co-opted the left of the party, made Hillary look silly on that point and yet looked tough so the independents stayed with it. It was a great strategy presidentially. The problem is now he's stuck with it and he is having to say, 'We're going to do what the general wants' after agonizing publically for way too long, 'but, they can never ask for more troops after this. And we are leaving, etc.' If I am sitting out there in the world, this is the craziest thing I've ever heard. But it does make sense to get the money which is what his political team who have a lot of power are doing.

The Democrats will come along because there's a draw down date. They will say, 'We don't like it but we're in with you. We'll fund it because you're going to send everyone home.' The Republicans hate the draw down date but love the troop numbers so they say, 'You're doing what the generals want. We'll go along with it and assume you are not serious about the draw down date.' It makes perfect Washington sense. That's very clever. The problem is the rest of the world doesn't understand it. And he still hasn't solved his fundamental problem that one of these two groups is about to desert him in a huge way and now will feel betrayed because of what he does. If he leaves, the Republicans will say 'Why did we build up in the first place when you were going to leave?' And the Democrats will say, 'You're Lindon Johnson. You just lied to us.' I think it's a terrible decision. It's short-termism of the worst kind. Whatever he does now, I can't see a positive way out of it for him.

JB: You write that another of Lawrence's lessons for the modern world teaches that given the complexities of the process, nation building should only be attempted when it is of vital national interest. Is this the case in Afghanistan and how?

John Hulsman: I think in a couple of ways. One, this was the base from which 9/11 was hatched. No one is arguing that there isn't a direct al-Qaeda link. And when you are directly struck down by an area and a group of people, self-defense of your people is pretty basic to primary interests. I think there it works. It also works for the Af-Pak reason. Pakistan and its nuclear security are absolutely vital for the security of the world and the United States and everybody knows it's the most dangerous country in the world. These two countries are indellibly linked - the boundary is something made up in London, it's not real out there and you can't separate the two. If you let it go under you would certainly run the risk of destabilitzing parts if not all of Pakistan given the weakness of the current civilian government.

Afghanistan sits on the doorstep of the most dangerous security problem potentially dealing with al-Qaeda, in the world. So that is a pretty big reason too. Where I am with Lawrence is - we are not going to make Afghanistan a happy first world multi-ethnic cosmopolitan center any time in my lifetime - it's not going to be Paris. On the otherhand, leaving it relatively stable, relatively friendly with a few red lines - you will not harbour al-Qaeda here, you will not give them sanctuary, we will help you police your boarders.  These basic things are what we are shooting for.

And the reason why the national interest arguement is vital is that it's the only way to sustain - given a flailing political will - any form of nation building. The reason why Somalia  and Kosovo were going to be cake walks is because there was no political will because there aren't primary interests involved. The minute 19 people are shot, we are out of there. And we have to stop doing that because people get more and more cynical about it. That's not smart. We should say, as we did with Germany and Japan, these are primary American interests and it's going to take a long time and we're  going to have bad days, bad weeks, bad months, bad years, but it's worth doing. I think people would respond to grown up language, I really do.

JB: You have just listed a number of America's interests. Are these unique to the US or does Germany share these. Does Germany have reasons to stay in Afghanistan as well?

John Hulsman: It's very hard in America not to ask for more from the allies when they have so conspicuously given so little over such a period of time while lecturing us - which is never popular. That drives me nuts about Europeans: if you have these views - where are the troops? where is the money? where is the policy? - I will settle for any of them. And then we can argue and we can disagree. I have to give the French their due - they do that. They are willing to be shot at, they are willing to throw money and they are certainly willing to yell back at me about ideas and I don't mind that. But don't strike a pose and do nothing. The world is too scary to do that.

I know zu Guttenburg a little bit, he's worked with me on some stuff and I have great respect for him. And I know he's carrying a lot of water at the moment. But I think he is a fine man and will at least try to make the arguments. I think part of it is that we are not starting at the beginning, we're starting this morning. Part of it is the cohesion of NATO itself which is certainly in question. And if NATO fails on this hugely important - according to everyone who did it - mission, what does that cost Germany? Whether you agree or disagree with me about Afghanistan, I think we can agree about NATO. And the United States is not in the position to write off your security anymore. Meaning it has to work both ways. We have to help each other and we need your help here. We think this is important and we are going to argue our case to you. Even if you think we are wrong, think through whether a colosal defeat in Afghanistan for NATO would be good for Germany. I don't think it would be.

So keep training more police, train more soldiers, use European expertise there, give us more money, keep troop levels about where they are, change the rules to allow your guys to shoot back when we need them to - and that's about it. I wouldn't ask zu Guttenberg to kill himself over this politically but I would ask for that. The bottom line is we are where we are this morning and we all know that if this thing comes totally unraveled, that NATOs cache which is the last thing standing of the alliance almost, really is put into question and I don't think given the scary world we are living in that that suits anybody.

JB: In summary, what are the key lessons that policymakers today can learn from Lawrence's lessons?"

John Hulsman: One: false analogies can be dangerous. Don't settle for what seems to be a simple analogy to a complicated question. Because if you say everything is like Germany and Japan in 1945, I can't think of any similarity with Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti and these two older examples.

Don't talk in shorthand - dig deeper. All of us intellectually need to do that. Even if you come to the same conclusion that is great but dig deeper, talk to people who actually know something about the country- it's history, it's culture, language, their art, what the streets smell like - I think that those are the things that Lawrence appreciated. What Lawrence did before the war in Carcamesh, he continued doing during the war - he did field work in an archeological way in Carcamesh before the war and he said that my job is to get other men to work better at what they are already doing. And I think that is an attainable nation building goal. I think that is away to avoid staying forever and making them into a happy American clone or do nothing - the two positions on nation building both of which strike me as pretty false. "Do less and do it better" is a really good way forward.

We will go through this again and it is important not to forget that there are different ideas for the more bottom-up organic local-stakeholder cultural effort to make this work. Not to liberate people from themselves, but help them help themselves. And that's not a semantical difference that is a philosophical difference.

JB: Thank you so much for the talk, John.